supplies, either of food or forage, could be gathered from the surrounding country. It may be added, that the same reasons which would make an invasion of East Tennessee, from Louisville or Cincinnati as a base, a difficult matter, would also make its retention by the Federals a difficult matter; and that a large part of any Federal army which should undertake to invade the country from the Ohio River, or which should attempt to retain possession of it until Chattanooga had been acquired by the Union forces, would have to be distributed at suitable points along the roads, more than two hundred miles long, which connect East Tennessee with Cincinnati or Louisville. These roads, too, it must not be forgotten, ran through a region more or less disaffected to the Union cause.

A movement upon East Tennessee was, however, strongly desired by the authorities at Washington. President Lincoln was very anxious that the Union people of that region, who, in defiance of threats and violence, were openly and strenuously maintaining their loyalty, should, as speedily as possible, be rescued by the strong arm of the United States from their perilous and trying position. He saw clearly the great political advantage which would accrue from a prompt and effectual furnishing of support to

these distressed Unionists. He hoped that a permanent addition to the resources of the Union could be made by the acquisition of East Tennessee, similar to that which had been made by the acquisition of "West Virginia. He also saw that, by the occupation of East Tennessee, a great artery of communication